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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.  
 This appeal—which involves New Jersey’s recent 




officers to cooperate with federal immigration authorities—
implicates important questions of federalism. Two New Jersey 
counties, a sheriff, and the oversight board of a county jail 
(collectively, Appellants), sued to invalidate and enjoin the 
directive. Appellants claim it is preempted by federal law. The 
District Court disagreed and dismissed their complaints. 
Because we agree with the District Court that federal law does 
not preempt the directive, we will affirm. 
I 
 In November 2018, New Jersey Attorney General 
Gurbir Grewal issued Law Enforcement Directive 2018-6, also 
known as the Immigrant Trust Directive. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 
14-5. It was revised and reissued, with minimal substantive 
changes, the next year. Concluding “that individuals are less 
likely to report a crime if they fear that the responding officer 
will turn them over to immigration authorities,” the Directive 
amended state rules to restrict interactions between state and 
local law enforcement and federal immigration officers. Id. at 
2–3. As relevant here, § II-B of the Directive barred counties 
and local law enforcement from assisting federal immigration 
authorities in these ways: 
2. Providing any non-public personally 
identifying information regarding any 
individual. 
3. Providing access to any state, county, or 
local law enforcement equipment, office 
space, database, or property not available 




4. Providing access to a detained individual 
for an interview, unless the detainee signs 
a written consent form . . . . 
5. Providing notice of a detained 
individual’s upcoming release from 
custody . . . . 
Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). Section II-B defined “[n]on-public 
personally identifying information” to include, among other 
things, “a social security number” and a “driver’s license 
number.” Id. at 5 n.1. The Directive also prohibited local law 
enforcement agencies and officials from entering “any 
agreement to exercise federal immigration authority pursuant 
to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id. 
at 7 (§ III-A). And it required local law enforcement to “notify 
a detained individual” when federal immigration authorities 
requested to interview the person, to have the person detained 
past his or her release date, or to be informed of the person’s 
upcoming release. Id. at 9 (§ VI-A). The Directive provided 
several exceptions to the limitations just described. It 
instructed that “[n]othing in Sections II.A or II.B shall be 
construed to restrict . . . state, county, or local law 
enforcement” from “[c]omplying with all applicable federal, 
state, and local laws,” including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644. 
Id. at 6-7 (§ II-C). 
 In September 2019, the County of Ocean and its Board 
of Commissioners (collectively, the Ocean County Plaintiffs) 
sued in the District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the Directive violated the United States Constitution and New 
Jersey law. The Ocean County Plaintiffs argued the Directive 
was preempted by two federal statutes: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 




“prohibit[ing], or in any way restrict[ing], any government 
entity or official from sending to, or receiving from” federal 
immigration authorities “information regarding the citizenship 
or immigration status . . . of any individual.” Section 1644 
contains similar language: “no State or local government entity 
may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or 
receiving from” federal immigration authorities “information 
regarding the immigration status . . . of an alien in the United 
States.” The Ocean County Plaintiffs argued the Directive’s 
bar on sharing personally identifying information—such as 
social security and drivers’ license numbers—conflicted with 
these federal laws. And that purported conflict rendered the 
Directive invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.  
 The next month, the County of Cape May and its sheriff, 
Robert Nolan (collectively, the Cape May County Plaintiffs), 
filed suit advancing similar challenges to the Directive. The 
Cape May Plaintiffs argued broadly that §§ 1373 and 1644 
preempted the Directive, and that the Directive’s prohibition 
on § 287(g) agreements unlawfully impeded the enforcement 
of federal immigration law.  
In November 2019, the District Court consolidated the 
two cases. Attorney General Grewal moved to dismiss. In July 
2020, the District Court granted the motion as to the federal 
claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the state claims.1 This timely appeal followed.  
 
1 The District Court dismissed the state law claims without 
prejudice, so the Ocean County Plaintiffs and the Cape May 





The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
review de novo the District Court’s order of dismissal. Klotz v. 
Celentano Stadtmauer & Walentowicz LLP, 991 F.3d 458, 462 
(3d Cir. 2021). 
A 
Before reaching the merits, we must address two 
threshold issues raised by the Attorney General.2 Both stem 
from Appellants’ political subdivision status. First, the 
Attorney General argues a state political subdivision—like a 
county—lacks standing to bring constitutional claims in 
federal court against the state that created it. Second, even if 
Article III standing exists, “as a categorical rule of 
constitutional law,” such subdivision suits are barred. A.G. Br. 
20. We disagree. 
 The Attorney General correctly notes that, in a line of 
cases dating back centuries, the Supreme Court rejected the 
idea that political subdivisions could pursue constitutional 
claims against their creator states in federal court. See, e.g., 
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (in relation to 
a political subdivision, “the state is supreme, and its legislative 
body, conforming its action to the state Constitution, may do 
as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of 
the United States”); see also Williams v. Mayor & City Council 
of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629–30 (1819). 
 




 Things changed, however, in 1960. In Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, the Supreme Court limited the sweeping language of 
its earlier opinions that suggested a per se bar on political 
subdivision suits. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Although the 
petitioners in Gomillion were individuals—not political 
subdivisions—the Court spoke broadly about the powers of a 
state legislature vis-à-vis its subdivisions. Id. at 344–45. 
“Legislative control of municipalities, no less than other state 
power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by 
the United States Constitution.” Id. Earlier language seemingly 
to the contrary, the Court cautioned, “must not be applied out 
of context.” Id. at 344. The “unconfined dicta” from cases like 
Hunter confirms only “that the State’s authority is unrestrained 
by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution considered in 
those cases.” Id. (emphasis added). Critical to this appeal, none 
of the early cases barring subdivision suits addressed the 
Supremacy Clause. 
 Since the Court’s opinion in Gomillion, three of our 
sister courts of appeals have permitted subdivisions to sue their 
creating states under the Supremacy Clause. See Tweed-New 
Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(allowing such suits as a matter of substantive law); Branson 
Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628–29 (10th Cir. 
1998) (allowing such suits, but discussing it as a matter of 
standing); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1070–71 (5th 
Cir. 1979). One circuit court has barred such subdivision suits. 
See City of San Juan Capistrano v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
937 F.3d 1278, 1280–81 (9th Cir. 2019). But see id. at 1284 
(Nelson, J., concurring) (calling for the Ninth Circuit to “revisit 
en banc” its per se bar). 
 In Tweed, the Second Circuit recognized the “unique 




reason for allowing such claims after Gomillion. 930 F.3d at 
73; see also Romer, 161 F.3d at 628–29 (political subdivisions 
may “assert[] the structural protections of the Supremacy 
Clause”); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of 
Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (“Supremacy Clause claims protect the interests of 
the federal government against encroachment by the states.”). 
“If the Supremacy Clause means anything,” the Second Circuit 
opined, “it means that a state is not free to enforce within its 
boundaries laws preempted by federal law.” Tweed, 930 F.3d 
at 73. Political subdivision suits “invoking the Supremacy 
Clause are one of the main ways of ensuring that this does not 
occur.” Id. We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit 
and hold that a political subdivision may sue its creator state in 
federal court under the Supremacy Clause.3 
B 
Having confirmed Appellants’ ability to bring this suit, 
we turn to the merits. The Ocean County Plaintiffs contend that 
express, conflict, and field preemption apply to § II-B-2 of the 
Directive (personally identifying information provision). The 
Cape May County Plaintiffs, on the other hand, challenge 
several provisions. First, they argue § II-B-2 and §§ II-B-4, 
II-B-5, and VI-A (notice and consent provisions) are conflict 
preempted because “they impose an obstacle [to] the federal 
 
3 Our opinion in Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991), 
is not to the contrary. In Amato, we addressed whether a county 
had third-party standing to sue an executive official for alleged 
violations of the First Amendment. See id. at 754–55. Here, 
Appellants argue their own rights were violated and advance 




government’s execution of federal immigration law.” Cape 
May Br. 5. They also argue § II-B-2 and II-B-5 are expressly 
preempted by §§ 1373 and 1644.  
Preemption is rooted primarily in the Supremacy Clause 
of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (federal law 
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”). In 
Murphy v. N.C.A.A., the Supreme Court offered guidance to 
lower courts presented with questions of federal preemption. 
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). As the Court explained, three types of 
preemption have emerged through caselaw—express, conflict, 
and field—but “all of them work in the same way.” Id. at 1480.  
For a federal law to preempt state law—regardless of 
the type of preemption claimed—it must satisfy two 
requirements. First, the federal law “must represent the 
exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the 
Constitution.” Id. at 1479. Second, because “the Constitution 
‘confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not 
States,’” id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
166 (1992)), the federal law “must be best read as one that 
regulates private actors,” id.; see also id. at 1481 
(“[R]egardless of the language sometimes used by Congress 
and this Court, every form of preemption is based on a federal 
law that regulates the conduct of private actors, not the States.” 
(emphasis added)). 
The two federal laws Appellants cite in this case—
§§ 1373 and 1644—cannot satisfy the second prerequisite. 
Section 1373 says that a “State . . . entity or official may not 
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or 




authorities. (Emphasis added). This is a clear prohibition on 
state action; it says nothing about private actors, so it cannot 
be fairly read to regulate them. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481.  
Section 1644 uses slightly different language: “no State 
or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way 
restricted,” from communicating immigration information to 
the federal government. Written in the passive voice, § 1644 
does not specify who may not prohibit or restrict state action. 
But in our view, the best reading of the provision is that it does 
not regulate private actors. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479. 
That’s because private actors can neither “prohibit[]” state 
action nor “restrict[]” it. See § 1644. A state, on the other hand, 
has the power to both “prohibit[]” and “restrict[]” actions by 
its own subdivisions. See id. So we conclude that § 1644, like 
§ 1373, regulates states, not private actors. 
Our conclusion that neither § 1373 nor § 1644 regulates 
private actors is fatal to Appellants’ argument that they 
preempt the Directive. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479, 1481. A 
federal statute that does not regulate private actors cannot serve 
as a basis for preemption, so Appellants’ claims must fail.4 
 
4 Because we agree with the District Court that §§ 1373 and 
1644 do not preempt the Directive, we do not opine on the 
Attorney General’s argument that §§ 1373 and 1644 violate the 
anticommandeering doctrine. We nevertheless acknowledge 
that courts addressing this issue have found one or both laws 
unconstitutional. See Cnty. of Ocean v. Grewal, 475 F. Supp. 




* * * 
The District Court did not err when it dismissed 
Appellants’ federal claims. Supreme Court precedent permits 
a political subdivision to bring Supremacy Clause-based 
claims against its creator state in federal court. But regardless 
of the wisdom of the Immigration Trust Directive, it is not 
preempted because 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 regulate only 
state action. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s order. 
